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Good Corporate Governance Policies and 




In the past decades, particularly following the collapse of huge 
corporation such as WorldCom and Enron due to dubious or 
illegal financial management, countries began gradually 
increasing the oversight of publicly traded companies with few 
jurisdictions conjuring recommended corporate governance 
ability to loot their companies, and 
 
While RCGC was intended namely for public company, several 
organizations called for the adoption of RCGC in startup 
companies. Startup companies suffer from various failures which 
the classic corporate laws are not equipped to address significant 
conflicts of interest throughout their financing process, interested 
composition. Among the proposed solutions for such failures, as 
regulated in recent years for public companies, is the 
implementation of such RCGC. This article presents the 
fundamental issues in startups which call for adoption of RCGC: 
the principal-agent problem, numerous conflicts of interest and 
misalignment of interest between the founders and the investors 
management and future. This article reviews the possible 
application of RCGC doctrines to startups; with respect to 
empirical and economical researchers that examine the benefit of 
RCGC on the value of startups and reducing the cost of raising 
capital, and researches and position papers which call for the 
 
1 LL.M. (Columbia University, New York), LL.B., B.A. (Interdisciplinary Center 
Herzliya, Israel). 
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adoption of RCGC in startup companies. This article also 
analyzes the clashes between the startups need for flexibility with 
the benefits and importance of adoption of RCGC. Lastly, the 
article presents various RCGC models, which have not yet been 
introduces in academic papers, which can be adopted in startups, 
inter alia, increasing the number of outside directors (both as a 
casting vote in even of founders-investors dead-locks as well as 
an impartial mentor for the founders), adopting procedures for 
board meetings and increasing their frequency, and amending the 
controlling and management rights in the company as a factor of 
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1. WHAT ARE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES AND 
WHY SHOULD THEY BE INTRODUCED IN PRIVATE COMPANIES 
Corporate governance, in its purest form, is a set of principles and 
conditions aimed at ensuring the adequate and appropriate allocation of 
the risks and returns from company activities between its various 
stakeholders, including stockholders, managers, creditor, employees and 
recently, also the community.2 Corporate governance principles are, inter 
 
2 J. ROBERT BROWN JR. & LISA L. CASEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 2 (2012). 
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composition and roles, transparency requirements to overcome 
information asymmetry between shareholders, and succession planning.3 
Similarly, to the discussion in public companies, the design of 
corporate governance principles in private companies is intended to 
prevent the relapse of past occurrences of abuse of shareholders capital by 
unchecked management, as was the case in Enron and WorldCom and to 
create an effective communication chancel between shareholders and 
management.4 
Following these premises, the OECD laid out a proposed structure of 
reassure shareholders and 
other stakeholders that their rights are protected and make it possible for 
corporations to decrease the cost of capital and to facilitate its access to 
the capital market 5 However, and unlike in public companies, in private, 
non-listed companies, the absence of market for corporate control (by, for 
example, hostile take-overs), reduces the ability to control for 
underperforming management.6 
The recent years have seen a shift of capital raising from the public to 
the private section. While concepts of corporate governance and good 
governance codes in public companies have been promulgated around the 
world for over three decades7, the notion of good governance in non-listed 
companies have been getting traction in the recent year. In this respect, 
OECD dedicated a summit and a comprehensive analysis of the 
implementation of corporate governance codes to non-listed companies, 
in particular in markets with less developed equity market.8 
Private companies, and particularly startups, have been financing their 
operations through a venture financing channel for the past several 
decades, which occurs under the assumption that venture capital should be 
raised from efficient capital market that price the risk accordingly.9 
However, unlike with public companies, which are subject to various 
regulatory corporate governance obligations, private companies 
 
3 Id. at 8-13. 
4 OECD, G20/OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (OECD Publishing, 
2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264236882-en. 
5 See id. at 10 (distinguishing that this structure is based on a soft power approach of 
comply or explain  model, rather than a mandatory regulation). 
6 Id. at 28. 
7 See Collins G. Ntim, Defining Corporate Governance: Shareholder Versus 
Stakeholder Models, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON BUSINESS SCHOOL, UK, Jan. 4, 2018, 
at 1. 
8 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), 
Corporate Governance of Non-Listed Companies in Emerging Markets, 
https://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/37190767.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2021). 
9 Ntim, supra note 7, at 5. 
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governance is subject to a loose (or even non-existent) oversight by 
regulators or the financial market. This is most amply reflected by the fact 
that startups governance is arguably not priced in the process of venture 
financing.10 
Lastly, it should be noted that implementation of good corporate 
governance guidelines have been found to reduce the cost of capital in 
bond-companies11 (however, additional research is required to determine 
if these results would bear similar effect on private companies and 
startups). 
2. LESSONS FROM ENRON  WHAT HAPPENS WITHOUT GOOD 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPALS 
On December 2001 Enron, which was considered for many years as 
one of the most innovative companies in the U.S. with reported profits of 
$1 Billion12 and among the largest corporations in the U.S., declared 
bankruptcy.13 apse were considered by 
many as destructive corporate governance practices that causes a steep 
decline in the trust of investors in the capital markets. This set in a motion 
various corporate governance reforms including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
14 
 
10 The question of appropriate financing of corporate governance has been widely 
debated; Bebchuk et. al found in the early 2010 s that while investors were (positively) 
surprised by introduction of corporate provisions until 2001, thereafter there was no 
indication that introducing such provisions had any bearing on the stock price (Bebchuk, 
L.A., Cohen, A. and Wang, C.C., 2013. Learning and the disappearing association between 
governance and returns. Journal of financial economics, 108(2). Moreover, Larcker and 
Tayan argued that the sheer number of variables on the stock price of public capital renders 
the mission to isolate the effect of corporate governance on the stock price impossible 
(Larcker, D.F. and Tayan, B., 2019. Loosey-Goosey Governance: Four Misunderstood 
Terms in Corporate Governance. Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford 
University). 
11 Feifei Zhu, Cost of Capital and Corporate Governance: International 





12 Peter Munzig, Enron and the Cconomics of Corporate Governance, DEP. OF 
ECONOMICS STANFORD UNIVERSITY, June 2003, at 3, 20, 
https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.198.1043&rep=rep1&type=pd
f. 
13 Stuart Gillan & John D. Martin, Corporate Governance Post-Enron: Effective 
Reforms, or Closing the Stable Door?, 13(5) JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE 929, 932 
(Feb. 2007). 
14 Id. at 932. 
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The Use o Special Purpose Entities in Financial 
Statements 
Enron implemented various questionable practices that created a 
smokescreen to the financial market. Amongst such practices was the use 
of off- SPE). While the U.S. 
accounting regulations at the time did not require companies to disclose or 
consolidate their SPEs in their financial statements, many scholars argue 
that companies could have, and arguably should have, provided indication 
of such, possibly by means of a detailed footnote or management 
discussion and analysis disclosure.15 The reason that omission of SPEs 
disclosure is detrimental for investors is the fact that the use of SPEs does 
not affect the credit rating of the parent company, which creates an 
. Additionally, this practice limits 
the ability of shareholders and the financial market to conduct the level of 
monitoring that is customarily provided by public market institutions.16 
It has been a
prevent, the managements prolific use of SMEs. This is, predominantly, 
-existing market-
provided vehicles, which should have at least raised concerns, and at best, 
led to an overall restriction of such practices by the Board.17 




compensation of more than $140 million, most of which was reflected in 
the value of his exercised options.19 It is imperative to note that this rate of 
compensation was more than ten times greater than that of an average CEO 
of a publicly traded company in that year.20 On the one hand, many 
economists argue that stock option grants to the C-level employees and 
directors are beneficial in that it aligns the interests of shareholders and 
management. However, such option grant could incentivize management 
 
15 Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New Information 
Order of Sarbanes-Oxley, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL, March 2003, at 1, 7-8, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=391363. 
16 Id. at 8. 
17 See id. at 4. 
18 Munzig, supra note 12, at 48. 
19 Id. at 30. 
20 Id. 
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to manipulate financial statements by self-dealing. This may occur by 
managers taking larger risks in order to increase the stock price of the 
company and as a result increase the value of their options.21 This concern 
22 The problem with this practice is that it unequally 
allocates the risk between the management and shareholders. The result of 
this would be that while the management is expected to benefit from the 
upside of the increased risk while any fallouts would mainly affect the 
shareholders.23 
It 
the management compensation, chiefly by knowingly failing to monitor 
plan 24 including the stock-based compensation structure.25 
It should be, therefore, of little surprise that the SOX imposes 
significant limitation on board discretion when it comes to 
26 Additionally, SOX created a 
mandatory corrective disclosure whenever the board is unable to 
27 
Financial Reporting Restatements 
During mid-2001, Enron started conducting a series of earning 
restatement for the period spanning from 1997-2001, which led to a 
28 Soon 
thereafter, on December 2001, Enron filed for bankruptcy.29 Some 
mechanisms placed to prevent recurrence of such were enshrined under 
SOX which compels the CEO and CFO to reimburse the company for any 
compensation that resulted in the company filing financial noncompliance 
restatement.30 
 
21 Id. at 31. 
22 Id. 
23 See id. 
24 Dennis M. Ray, Corporate Boards and Corporate Democracy, 20 JOURNAL OF 
CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP 93, 95 
(2005), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.530.6809&rep=rep1&t
ype=pdf. 
25 Gordon, supra note 15, at 4. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. (arguing that such overwhelming elimination of the board s discretion could be 
counter-productive). 
28 Munzing, supra note 12, at 20-21. 
29 Id. at 21. 
30 Id. at 48. 
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The Result of Insufficient Board Oversight 
The lack of Board independence gets to the core oversight 
function of a board of directors. It is imperative that a 
board be capable of looking objectively at the 
management and outside professional advisors of a firm, 
s not capable in this respect. This 
layer of corporate governance, that is the board oversight 
function, should act as a final mechanism to protect 
investors when other governance institutions have broken 
down. It should serve to help avoid conflicts of interest, 
ensure auditing independence and accurate financial 
reporting, oversee compensation practices, as well as 
many other breakdowns that occurred within Enron. This 
last layer, however, failed to serve its purpose and was 
compromised largely because of the relationships 
between Enron, management, and the directors 
themselves.31 
3. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE UNDER EXISTING LEGAL REGIME 
a. Disclosures 
Disclosure is, in essence, a mechanism by which companies share 
information on their financials, operations, and developments with their 
shareholders.32 In particular, disclosure enables shareholders and board 
members to make informed decisions.33 The catastrophes of recent history, 
informed co Board often failed to give enough consideration 
when approving costly or risky decisions and transactions, even with 
insufficient information or grasp of the types of transactions Enron was 
engaging in.34  monitor the 
an increased risk 
to existing and prospect investors.35 
To date, periodic reports remain a critical source of information for 
shareholders of public companies, as varying regulation enable companies 
 
31 Id. at 46. 
32 Brown & Casey, supra note 2, at 509. 
33 Id. 
34 See Munzing, supra note 12, at 6-7. 
35 Gordon, supra note 15, at 4. 
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to interact with the public market in less formal ways, commonly not 
subject to SEC regulation, and enables companies to engage in selective 
disclosure to specific shareholders or investors.36 
For public companies, there are various regulatory disclosure 
obligations; for example, companies with more than 500 shareholders of 
record and assets in the access of $10M must file quarterly reports to their 
respective shareholders.37 In private companies, however, the disclosure 
obligations are far scarcer, depending heavily on the type of exempted 
offering38 and are otherwise namely contractual-dependent. Moreover, the 
only information available to the pubic are the Regulation D exempt 
offerings.39 The most common contractual mechanism of disclosure for 
venture-
agreement which sets forth, inter alia, the right of major investors to access 
certain information of private companies, and often also includes the right 
to appoint a board observer, and commonly requires provisions of 
quarterly and annual financial statements.40 However, while this is a rather 
powerful contractual tool, it is namely reserved for major investors, and 
other stockholders have no access to such information and observance 
rights.41 
company voluntarily disclose any financial reports, regardless of firm 
42 
43 On the other hand, some calls have been made to 
regulate the disclosure obligations in private companies once they reach a 
certain market capitalization (namely, above $1 Billion in valuation).44 
The significance of this proposal is founded in the fact that unicorns share 
similar traits to those of public companies, both in size and effect on the 
economy and communities. For example, Uber, prior to its IPO earlier this 
 
36 Brown & Casey, supra note 2, at 549 ( Whenever an issuer, or any person acting on 
its behalf, discloses any material nonpublic information regarding that issuer or its 
securities to any person described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, the issuer shall make 
public disclosure of that information as provided in § 243.101(e) . . . ). 
37 Id. 
38 Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private Economy, 57 
B.C. L. REV. 583, 591 (2016) (noting that many venture financings rely on Regulation D 
safe harbors  which indicate the type of disclosure required by the company to the 
investors). 
39 Id. at 598. 
40 Id. at 596-597. 
41 Id. 
42 Michael Minnis & Nemit Shroff, Why Regulate Private Firm Disclosure and 
Auditing?, 47(5) ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 473, 474 (2017). 
43 Id. 
44 Fan, supra note 38, at 609. 
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year, reportedly had tens of thousands drivers across the globe and grosses 
billions of dollars.45 Therefore, in light of the recent trend toward favoring 
stakeholder approach of corporate purpose, a company with such a 
significant impact on the economy and communities, which operation 
often requires changes in infrastructure which cannot be accounted for 
sans data about the company and its operation, should be adequately 
monitored by the public and regulators. This is in line with the basis of the 
stakeholder approach, which stipulates that since local communities 
supply the companies with local infrastructure and employees, they 
require in return an improvement in their quality of life46 (which can only 
be ensured and regulated with sufficient information and disclosures from 
the companies). 
(1) Benefit of disclosure regime 
Behavior Correction 
Disclosure serves as an effective corporate governance mechanism as 
it creates an incentive for improved governance in order to avoid 
disgraceful disclosure by being required to correct matters subject to 
disclosure.47 
The mandatory disclosure regime is particularly important for several 
additional reasons: 
 Misalignment of interest  misalignment of interest between 
management and shareholders have been found to generate 
ineffective financial and growth results for startups, both with 
respect to growth as well as returns for stockholders48, whereas 
the misalignment might be eliminated by gapping the information 
asymmetry through mandatory disclosure. 
 Non-diversifiable Investment  an effective governance system 
(inter alia, through mechanism of disclosure) have been found to 
increase shareholders likelihood to invest even though they might 
face a reduced ability to diversify their investment or increase 
their likelihood to invest in poor-performing companies.49 
 
45 Id. at 599-600. 
46 Ntim, supra note 7, at 9. 
47 Brown & Casey, supra note 2, at 509. 
48 Michael Klausner & Stephen Venuto, Liquidation Rights and Incentive Misalignment 
in Start-up Financing, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1399, 1399 (2013). 
49 Allen Ferrell, The Case for Mandatory Disclosure in Securities Regulation Around 
the World, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 81, 107 (2007). It should also be noted that 
diversification is a crucial instrument for an investor which is often associated with an 
increased cost of capital. Angela Gore, Does Mandatory Disclosure Reduce the Cost of 
Capital? Evidence from Bonds, LUNDQUIST COLLEGE OF BUSINESS, UNIVERSITY OF OREGON 
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 Reduction in transaction costs  Many economists found that a 
regime of mandatory disclosures of information by companies not 
only 
50, lowering the cost of credit51 and 
increase its liquidity.52 
 Reduction in race-to-capital competition  As indicated by the 
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Jay 
Increased disclosure and other burdens may render 
alternatives for raising capital, such as the private markets, 
increasingly attractive. 53 Therefore, among the benefits of 
disclosure in small companies is the reduction in competition with 
large public companies over capital;54 the new access of small 
information, acts as an intermediary of information sharing and 
increases the attractiveness of investing in the small company. 
This adds an additional layer of incentive to private companies to 
disclose information, as credit rating agencies tend to increase the 
credit rating of companies with organized disclosure 
mechanism.55 ncial status 
and operation can be a positive indicator of its growth potential 
investors of its transparency and thus reduce the risk (and cost) of 
venture financing (by reducing the required due diligence and 
implementation of safeguards).56 
 Disclosure credibility  one of the suggestions made in connection 
with the creation of a mandatory disclosure regime is to require 
disclosure to an impartial third party. That is since a disclosure to 
a third party, rather to an investor, increases the credibility of the 
disclosure and would potentially reduce transaction costs.57Also, 
especially for micro-companies wishing to opt in to such 
 
1, 5 (July 2012). This further supports the significance of disclosure regime even compared 
to an investor s right to demand a higher return. 
50 Benito Arruñada, Mandatory Accounting Disclosure by Small Private Companies, 32 
EUR. J. LAW ECON. 377, 379 (2010). 
51 Id. at 380. 
52 Gore, supra note 49 at 1. 
53 Macfarland, Matt, SEC chairman: Disclosure requirements encourage companies to 
stay private, The SNL Insurance Daily; Charlottesville (July 13, 2017). 
54 Arruñada, supra note 50, at 398. 
55 Id. at 401. 
56 Zhu, supra note 11 at 2 3. On the other hand, startups should be cautious on disclosure 
since it could be viewed as desperate to receive influx of cash which would increase the 
cost of capital. 
57 Arruñada, supra note 50, at 389. 
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mandatory-disclosure regime, an external mandatory rule can save 
them a cost in terms of evaluating the value of disclosure in an 
optional-
be perfectly rational in evaluating costs and benefits but may be 
pressured by maladapted social norms to behave in accordance 
with the norm. This may happen, for instance, if the norm imposes 
additional costs (e.g., a reputational loss) on those who do not 
58 
While mandatory disclosure does not necessarily benefit small 
companies as it does to public ones, there is a requirement, though less 
comprehensive, of information disclosure by small private companies in 
connection with investments.59 
(2) Objection to disclosure regime 
Irrespective of the benefits mentioned above, the main discouraging 
factor is the costs associated with disclosure, particularly for small 
tax position which could require retaining expensive advisors. 
Additionally, small companies are often incapable of correctly estimating 
the costs and benefits of disclosure, particularly in companies with 
separation of ownership and control.60 Moreover, private and public 
companies alike may suffer several harms that disincentivize disclosure, 
amongst them, competitive disadvantage and loss of personal privacy.61 
This concern is substantiated by several researchers that have found that 
62 
In this respect, a more comprehensive disclosure regime or an 
expansion of statutory disclosure exemptions may limit the costs 
associated with disclosure since all non-disclosing companies would be 
required to find an alternative means to provide information to investors 
 
58 Id. at 404. 
59 Id. at 396. 
60 Id. at 404. 
61 Id. 
62 Dee Gill, Should private companies be required to report their financials?, CHICAGO 
BOOTH REVIEW (June 22, 2017), 
https://review.chicagobooth.edu/accounting/2017/article/should-private-companies-be-
required-report-their-financials. In this regard, it should be indicated that in a review 
conducted by the Wall Street Journal, many noted to refrain from divulging financial 
information to prevents it from falling into rival hands  which enables companies 
freedom to invest for the long term . See Rolfe Winkler, Startup Employees Invoke 
Obscure Law to Open Up Books, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (May 24, 2016), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/startup-employees-invoke-obscure-law-to-open-up-books-
1464082202. 
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(and thus disincentivized from operating outside the disclosure regime).63 
In addition to direct costs, several researchers indicated the existence of 
indirect costs, such as the cost of monitoring, compiling, and 
disseminating the financial information.64 The information intermediaries 
(such as the credit rating agencies) tend to be relevant with respect to small 
companies, since some provide incomplete data to the intermediary and 
other completely fail to cooperate, resulting in incomplete data of the 
intermediary.65 Small companies often face significant competition (which 
is more detrimental to their survival than to listed and established firms). 
Therefore, since disclosure exposes small companies to other companies 
exploiting their data, such companies might be disincentivized to 
disclose.66 However, several researchers found that in some cases the 
benefits from the ability to learn about the financial information of 
information.67 
Disclosure decision by company managers can be one that would not 
maximize the value of the firm for shareholders, which may occur due to 
misalignment of management and ownership.68 However, commonly 
small firms have little separation of ownership and management since the 
managers area usually also the shareholders. 
b.  Board of Directors 
(1) Structure 
The current version of the Delaware General Corporation Code 
contains virtually no qualification prerequisites for board members, and 
shall apply.69 This approach has been widely criticized, inter alias, by 
Ralph Nadar who contended that board members are often unaware of 
management illicit behavior, such as discrimination, workplace hazard, 
and the likes.70 
 
63 Arruñada, supra note 50, at 382. 
64 Gore, supra note 49, at 3. 
65 Arruñada, supra note 50, at 404. 
66 Id.; Gore, supra note 49, at 5 6. 
67 See Gill, supra note 62. 
68 Arruñada, supra note 50, at 29. 
69 ZABIHOLLAH REZAEE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POST-SARBANES-OXLEY, 
REGULATIONS, REQUIREMENTS, AND INTEGRATED PROCESSES 217 218 (2007). 
70 See RALPH NADER, MARK GREEN, AND JOEL SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT 
CORPORATION 17 32 (1977) (citing which calls to question, for example, the requirement 
for appointment of independent directors.). 
44 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:31 
The importance of a strong monitoring board is essential, and 
particularly important in public companies in light of the Enron scandal. 
fiduciary duties and responsibility to shareholders.71 
In private companies, the composition of the board of directors of a 
startup changes rapidly during the nascent stages of the company, when 
72 However, 
following the a financing round in the startup, member(s) of the investor(s) 
ongoing management.73 
It has been widely established that there is a commonplace disparity 
in of interest and mindset between the founder-manager, investors, and 
external board members. This is, in part, due to the fact management 
directors, particularly in private companies (and even more so in startups), 
are not compensated for their position in the board, unlike investor-
directors and external directors which often receive compensation in a 
form of stock options, commonly ranging between 0.5%-1% of the 
74 Moreover, the founder-manager director 
show to have more psychological attachment and passion to the 
company75, and investor-director are more focused on growth and have 
fiduciary duty to their own investors to advance successful exit 
strategies76, while public company directors focus on long-term strategic 
planning and monitoring.77 Therefore, private company board is much 
more prone to conflicts of interest and goal determination than in public 
companies.78 
(2) Role and purpose in corporate governance. 
The role of the board of directors in private companies vary rapidly 
between managerial approaches and scholars. At its core, the board of 
 
71 Brown and Casey, supra note 2, at 96. 
72 JONAS GABRIELSSON, HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 113 (2017). 
73 Id. 
74 Suren Dutia, Primer for Building an Effective Board for Growing Startup Companies, 
1, 7 (2014), https://www.kauffman.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/12/primer_for_building_an_effective_board.pdf. 
75 Gabrielsson, supra note 72, at 114. 
76 Renée B. Adams, Benjamin E. Hermalin, and Michael S. Weisbach, THE ROLE OF 
BOARDS OF DIRECTORS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND 
SURVEY 29 30 (2009). 
77 Brown & Casey, supra note 2, at 96. 
78 Gabrielsson, supra note 72, at 114. 
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directors is responsible for laying a framework of corporate objectives, 
 firing, and compensation 
of senior management and interaction with shareholders.79 Moreover, the 
board of directors is the ultimate supervisory body of the company and the 
ultimate responsibility for good corporate governance of the company.80 
Per the Del
of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or 
under the direction of the board of directors, except as otherwise be 
provided in this chapter or in its certification of incor 81 The 
significance of this provisions is based on the fact that it is optional and 
Professor Stephan Bainbridge stipulates, the provision would easily be 
applied close corporations82, as is the case of startup companies. 
For example, one method for eliminating the majority tyranny is to 
require that major decision in the company will require the approval of all 
shareholders (or the majority of each type of shares, if the company issued 
preferred stock, or several series thereof), in order to prevent controlling 
shareholders that commonly also control the board to take value-extraction 
resolution against the interest of the minority shareholders.83 
Brown and Casey argue that the board of directors is responsible for 
management of the business and affairs of the corporation as well as to 
delegate managerial duties to person on which the board is tasked with 
monitoring.84 
85 Another criticism 
86 This 
approach does not come without opposition; Adams et. al, referring to 
 
79 John D. Sullivan, Andrew Wilson, and Anna Nadgrodkiewicz, The Role of Corporate 
Governance in Fighting Corruption, at 11 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ru/Documents/finance/role_corporate_g
overnance_sullivan_eng.pdf. 
80 Rezaee, supra note 69, at 87. 
81 Del. Code Ann., Tit. 8, § 141(a). 
82 Stephen Bainbridge, DGCL Section 141(a) versus Precommitment Strategies, (Dec. 
30, 2005) https://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2005/12/dgcl-
section-141a-versus-precommitment-strategies.html. 
83 However, there s a caveat to this approach in a form of transaction proposed by a 
controlling shareholding which conditions its approval of the transaction upon the approval 
of the majority of the minority shareholders. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. 
Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev.785,785 (2003). 
84 Brown & Casey, supra note 2. 
85 Adams, supra note 76, at 64. 
86 Brown & Casey, supra note 2, at 96. 
46 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:31 
be provide discipline to the management.87 
Moreover, even accepting the premise that contemporary board is able 
to and expected to oversee and discipline the management, the board is 
unlikely to be preempt managerial wrongs, particularly absent information 
from outside auditors.88 This is, in part, since board is rarely involved in 
the daily operational aspect of company management.89 
(3) Minutes 
The board of directors is the collegial organ of the company which 
decisions are commonly made by a majority vote.90 The board meetings 
themselves raise several good governance questions; for example, the 
prior notice of board meetings, sans explicit prescript
charter, can be made as late as two days prior notice, and there is no 
statutory obligation that such notices specify the purpose of the meeting.91 
However, good corporate governance would require for directors to be 
specification of the meetings purpose (including the relevant 
documentation) are advised.92 
deliver, prior to each meeting, the appropriate agenda which shall include 
the information and materials that will be delivered to directors and the 
matters that will be addressed and acted upon during the meeting.93 
(4) Committees 
While private companies are not legally required to form committees, 
it has become a common practice for private companies, particularly those 
who issue bonds, to establish various committees to which the board 
delegate certain tasks.94 Audit committee is among the most ubiquitous 
and important committees in private companies; It is in charge of 
independent review of the financial records of the company, engagement 
with the auditor 
 
87 See Adams, supra note 76, at 64 (referencing Jay Lorsch, Pawns or Potentates: The 
Reality of America s Corporate Boards, Harv. Bus. School Press (1989)). 
88 Id. at 65. 
89 Brown & Casey, supra note 2, at 96. 
90 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW AND ECONOMICS 213 (Foundation Press 
2d. ed 2002). 
91 Id. at 215. 
92 Id. (  . . . although directors are free to contest. ). 
93 Stuart Gelfond, Robert Schwenkel & Hayley Cohen, Private Company Boards, 20 
THE J. OF PRIVATE EQUITY SUMMER 2017 3 (2017). 
94 Bainbridge supra note 90, at 215. 
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In addition, the existence of an audit committee has an additional 
significant in private companies since they are often less sophisticated than 
public companies, have less organizational structure and understanding of 
financials, and therefore an independent committee of experts can be a 
controls and prevention of illicit actions by the management.95 
In this regard, it is pertinent to reference the provisions of SOX that 
be composed of entirely independent directors and prohibits outside 
auditors from concurrently consulting a company it audits.96 
c.  Who Should Direct Company Corporate Governance  
Shareholder Primacy Vs. Board Primacy Vs. Management 
Primacy? 
For many years, the leading approach of company purpose was the 
shareholder primacy, pursuant to which company must operate, was to 
97 The basis of this notion 
relies on the fact that the providers of capital delegated their daily 
management of the company to the management and the board which in 
return must act as the shareholders fiduciaries.98 
The shareholding model also enables a mechanism for overcoming the 
agency problem it is associated with; Cadbury found that this model 
support the adoption of a voluntary corporate governance code of ethics 
and conduct, which lays out accountability and transparency principles, 
intended to regulate management activity.99 This methodology manifest 
the crux of my argument in this paper  that adoption of good corporate 
governance principles, coupled with board supervision, are best to 
overcome the misalignment of interest in startup companies between 
shareholders, directors and managers-founders.100 
 
95 Id. at 215. 
96 Id. at 48-49. 
97 Ntim, supra note 7, at 3. 
98 Bainbridge supra note 90, at 48-49. 
99 Ntim supra note 7, at 5 (referencing Cadbury, C., Report of the Committee on the 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance ICAEW (1992) 
https://www.icaew.com/technical/corporate-governance/codes-and-reports/cadbury-
report). 
100 Id. (noting that that imposition of obligations by the government or other supervisory 
authorities would be counterproductive under an assumption of efficient factor markets as 
well as the fact that it would limit the bargaining power of the actors in the investment 
process). 
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The notion of the shareholder primacy also derives the purpose and 
role of the board of directors; Until recently, the pervasive view was that 
the primary goal of the board of directors management of the company 
was to achieve long-term shareholder value.101 However, this approach 
announcement that it views the purpose of companies in a broader view as 
102 and thus reflects a 
shift towards a stakeholder primacy, rather than maximize shareholder 
profits. 
Moreover, last year Senator Elizabeth Warren introduced the 
Accountable Capitalism bill103 which shifts the fundamental notion of 
 requiring that 40% of 
directors in companies, grossing above $1 billion annually, be selected by 
employees.104 
The stakeholder model, in essence, is a notion that a company is not 
just a for- -
accountability and responsibility towards various stakeholders, such as 
employees, the government and local community, to name a few.105 
In this respect, it was argued that a governance structure of a firm is 
aimed at maximizing shareholders value instead of promoting the interests 
of other existing and potential stakeholders of the company.106 
This distinction is significant since it would affect the identity of the 
appropriate organ to promote adequate corporate governance in the 
c
is often lacking comprehensive market viewpoint and focused narrowly 
on the company and its success, the board of directors often includes 
representatives of venture capital funds107, many of which are industry 
experts, which can more effectively promote governance devices which 
 
101 See Ntim supra note 7, at 7 (emphasizing that it is no longer sufficient for board s to 
merely oversee the financial results but rather take a more active role in the development 
of ethical culture of the company). 
102 Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote An 
Economy That Serves All Americans , BUS ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), 
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-
corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans. 
103 S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2017). 
104 Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance; Stakeholder Primacy; Federal Incorporation, 
HARV. LAW (Aug. 17, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/08/17/corporate-
governance-stakeholder-primacy-federal-incorporation/. 
105 Ntim, supra note 7, at 2. 
106 Id. 
107 Fan, supra note 38, at 590. 
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would also take into consideration cross-market entities, such as the 
community, suppliers, and creditors.108 
ation is a 
precursor of its obligation to promote corporate social responsibility.109 
This stance is a gapping bridge between the stakeholder primary approach 
and the board primary approach. The latter, in a nutshell, is a view per 
which shareholders ought to endow the board with sufficient power to 
manage the company effectively, foregoing short-term value and decision-
making.110 
lacking structural consensus, is that the board should be granted with 
111 It is important to note, however, that the fundamental 
-making would be 
less efficient, as they are lacking the requisite knowledge and 
understanding of the firm to make an efficient determination vis-à-vis the 
directors which are involved in the core operation of the company.112 
4. POSSIBLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SOLUTIONS TO 
MARKET FAILURES 
Board independence 
Following the previous arguments supporting the increase of director 
negative correlation between the success of the CEO and independence of 
the board, meaning, the more successful the CEO the less independent the 
board will be (since the monitoring will seem less optimal as the CEO is 
doing a good job).113 This is, to some extent, a legal (market) failure, since 
as a matter of law a conflict between the board and the management should 
 
108 In this respect, White indicated that in light of the board of directors  power to cast 
company determinations through its board resolutions, as well as its composition, it should 
be the organ accountable for balancing the various stakeholders in the Company. Allen L. 
White, The Stakeholder Fiduciary: CSR, Governance and the Future of Boards, BUS. FOR 
SOC. RESP. (Apr. 2006), https://www.bsr.org/reports/BSR_AW_Corporate-Boards.pdf. 
109 Id. at 4. 
110 Grant Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and The Curious Turn 
Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071, 2071 (2010). 
111 Id. at 2088-89. 
112 Id. at 2089. 
113 Adams, supra note 76, at 66. 
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However, this approach could be counterproductive, particularly in the 
sphere of startups; reason being, as was found by Adams et. al, that an 
increase in director independence leads to better CEO efficiency, shorter 
CEO tenure and higher overall CEO compensation.115 Therefore, since 
many startup directors are either representative of investors, possessing 
substantial market and management knowledge, and are also functioning 
as mentors to the founder-managers (and founder-CEO), they should be 
granted with greater independence to prevent inexperienced founder-
managers from either looting the shareholders or making ill-advised 
decisions.116 
In this respect, it should be noted there are other factors that affect the 
risk of replacement, a seemingly plausible assumption would be increased 
supervision which will result is higher company performance. However, 
since there is an underlying assumption that the board is at any given time 
board composition would result, in theory, in reduction in optimal 
supervision).117 
While board independence in public companies is necessary (as to 
ensure the management acts in the best interest of the public shareholders), 
majority shareholders (whom are commonly also the management), as 
otherwise they are viewed as ineffective118 mainly since in private 
companies, more often than in public ones, directors operate as mentors to 
the management, providing commercial knowledge to the management.119 
Additionally, board independence is particularly salient in viewing 
he Board failed to prevent 
 partnerships and failed to exert 
sufficient oversight of such relationships.120 
 
114 Brown & Casey, supra note 2, at 97. 
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116 BRAD FELD & MAHENDRA RAMSINGHANI, STARTUP BOARDS: GETTING THE MOST OUT 
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118 DOUG RAYMOND, INDEPENDENCE AND THE PRIVATE COMPANY BOARD: ADOPTING 
SARBANES-LIKE RULES ON DIRECTOR INDEPENDENCE WOULD IMPAIR THE SMOOTH 
FUNCTIONING OF THE BUSINESS, Dir. & Boards (2005). 
119 Gabrielsson, supra note 72, at 113. 
120 Munzing, supra note 12, at 6-7. Munzig further argues that these failures resulted from 
insufficient communication and direction by the board of the government, whereas, as 
argued throughout this paper, board mentoring  of the management results in preferable 
financial and operational results. 
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b. Introduction of independent director 
Independent directors are generally viewed as director who have no 
ongoing (or prior) relationship with the corporation other than as a 
director.121 The importance of the appointment of independent directors is 
exemplified in several spheres: the first, Delaware court tend to condition 
transaction only when the board action has been taken by an independent 
director.122 Moreover, as the appointment of independent directors became 
a manifestation of good corporate governance123, neglecting to act 
accordingly to can cause market distrust. In this respect, Broughman 
analyzed the benefit of introduction of independent director in startup 
companies.124 In startups, independent directors currently fill several 
duties, inter alia, breaking deadlocks in the board and impartial oversight 
on the management for the common stockholders (since other boards are 
usually representing the founder-managers or the investors).125 An 
additional benefit of including an independent director(s), which are often 
interests of the various organs of the company in major company 




In this paper, I have analyzed the current corporate governance regime 
that applies to private companies, with particular attention to the particular 
characteristics of startups, vis-à-vis the growing research on the effect of 
good governance in public companies for the past decades. 
It has been found that implementation of good/recommended 
 
121 Brown & Casey, supra note 2, at 108 (citing Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of 
Independent Directors in the United State, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock 
Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1968-83 (2007)); see generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, 
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and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1468-83 (2007). 
122 Brown & Casey, supra note 2 at 106. 
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transaction costs, improves corporate management (though still unsure if 
affects company share price) and reduces the misalignment of interest 
between the various corporate organs (founders-managers, directors, and 
shareholders). 
I have indicated several good-governance approaches that have been 
found by various legal scholars and economists alike to be successful in 
implementation in private companies, inter alia, introduction of 
independent director, creation of audit committee, elaborated board 
materials and longer notice period, alongside some more groundbreaking 
suggestions such as a mandatory disclosure regime, that can affect the 
inherent risk and uncertainty associated with startup venture financing. 
While startups require flexibility in operation in order to successfully 
implement their disruptive technology, as I have indicated in this paper, 
the implementation of the aforementioned good governance 
method, as was used by the OECD private company guidelines) could 
have positive effects both on their management, financing ability and 
future growth. 
